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Status for the Bounty Hunter, . . and Other




Sometimes writing about and practicing antitrust law takes me
back to the days when I was a Pennsylvania small-town teenager.
I recall a definite feeling of embarrassment-even guilt-whenever
Bill Prince and I collected the 25-cent and 3-dollar bounties the state
paid for every weasel that sampled our trap-line baits and every
fox my tireless beagle chased before our sights. First of all, my favorite
authors of those days took a very dim view of bounty hunters. And,
second, it just didn't seem right to get paid for having so much fun.
That feeling comes back to me now once in a while-but not very
often.
It was at the 1966 Montreal meeting of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Section of Antitrust Law that I first heard a suggestion that
treble-damage plaintiffs are becoming "bounty hunters." The speak-
er's worst fears have been realized. Just last term the United States
* Based in part upon a paper delivered by the author before the Section of Antitrust
Law, American Bar Association, in Philadelphia, Pa., August 7, 1968, and upon Analyses
prepared for the August 13, 1968 and September 10, 1968 issues of BNA's Antitrust &
Trade Regulation Report.
t Associate, Law Offices of Worth Rowley, Washington, D.C.; member of District of
Columbia and Pennsylvania Bars; former managing editor, BNA's Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Report; member, Legislation Committee and Committee on Publications,
ABA Section of Antitrust Law.
1. Pollack, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32
ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 38 (1968).
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Supreme Court sustained 2 the very line of decisions he criticized as
developing a "bounty-hunter device . . . that Congress quite plainly
never adopted." 3
THE "PASSING-ON" DEFENSE
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 4 allows recovery of treble damages by
any person injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws." Once a private plaintiff has proven
an antitrust violation and established standing to sue, he next must
show that he was in fact injured in his business or property. Almost
every antitrust damage claimant has sought recompense for one or
more of three types of injury: (1) loss of profits he would have earned
in a freely competitive market, including increased cost of doing
business; (2) loss of capital or decrease in value of investment; and (3)
excessive price he had to pay for a product he consumed, resold, or
blended with others to make a new product.
Price fixing is -the most common charge made in antitrust treble-
damage complaints. Consequently, proof of damages frequently con-
sists of showing the difference between the prices a complaining
buyer paid his defendant-supplier and the prices he would have paid
but for the antitrust violation. If the complaining buyer is not an
ultimate consumer or a public agency representing consumers, he need
not always absorb the entire overcharge passively. He may be able
to preserve his profit level by increasing his own price, by cutting
other costs, or by increasing his sales volume. Prior to Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.5 the federal courts engaged in
considerable backing and filling on the issue whether the supplier can
disprove damages by showing that the overcharge was passed along
to the buyer's customers.
In the Hanover Shoe case, an 8-1 Supreme Court majority de-
clared the passing-on defense inoperative in almost all buyer-supplier
situations.
If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and ab-
sorbs the loss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems
conceded. The reason is that he has paid more than he should
2. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
3. Pollack, supra note 1, at 38.
4. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731; 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1965).
5. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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and his property has been illegally diminished, for had the price
paid been lower his profits would have been higher. It is also
clear that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, main-
tains his own jrice but takes steps to increase his volume or to
decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed. Though
he may manage to maintain his profit level, he would have made
more if his purchases from the defendant had cost him less. We
hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises
the price for his own product. As long as the seller continues
to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than
the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he
pays the seller remains illegally high, and his profits would be
greater were his costs lower .... 6
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies.
Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions
cannot be measured after the fact .... Even if it could be shown
that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount
of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had
not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuper-
able difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff
could not or would not have raised his prices absent the over-
charge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been
discontinued.7
The Court was also apprehensive that injection of the passing-on
issue into treble-damage litigation would mean that damage actions
"would be substantially reduced in effectiveness." Although the task
of showing that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have
raised his prices in the absence of the overcharge "would normally
prove insurmountable," the Court thought it "not unlikely that if the
existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants
will frequently seek to establish its applicability." As a result, "treble
damage actions would often require additional long and complicated
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories," and
the damage claim would pass along to ultimate consumers with "only
a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action."8
There might be situations, the opinion acknowledged, where the
passing-on defense could succeed:
for instance, when on overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-
plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been
6. Id. at 489.
7. Id. at 492-93.
8. Id. at 493-94.
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damaged-where the considerations requiring that the passing-
on defense not be permitted in this case would not be present.
We also recognize that where no differential can be proved
between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the
seller was required by law to charge, establishing damages might
require a showing of loss of profits to the buyer.9
In a footnote to the last quoted sentence the court stated:
Some courts appear to have treated price discrimination cases
under the Robinson-Patman Act in this category. See, e.g., Amer-
ican Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (C.A.8th
Cir. 1951); American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F.2d 919,
opinion modified, 190 F.2d 73 (C.A.5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
342 U.S. 875 (1951).1 0
Visible between the lines of the Hanover Shoe opinion is an im-
pressive cache of weapons for the bounty hunter. The Court's out-
spoken desire to avoid any impairment of the effectiveness of treble-
damage actions as an antitrust enforcement tool leads one to believe
that it may not regard the amount of an illegal overcharge as the
exclusive measure of the buyer's lost profits. Conceivably, the buyer
could show that the actual economic effects of increased prices went
beyond the amount of the overcharge. He might prove, for examples,
added carrying charges involved in financing a more expensive in-
ventory, loss of profits on further sales he would have made if he
had not had to raise his own prices, or increased selling costs in-
curred in attempting to prevent a drop in sales.
On the other hand, the Court was explicit in saying that in most
commercial contexts the seller cannot reduce recovery below the
amount of the overcharge-whether by proof of passing-on, cost
reduction, or increased sales volume. It simply makes no difference
what happened to the buyer's profit level. Through his overcharge,
the seller took "more than the law allows,"" and the buyer is en-
titled to full reimbursement plus the full benefit of any measures
he took to mitigate his damage. Since he had a right to, and might
have, taken those mitigating steps even in the absence of the alleged
overcharge, the gains he realized from them are not really related
to, and hence do not reduce his damage from, the antitrust violation.
Neither of the situations that the Court says might allow applica-
9. Id. at 494.
10. Id. at 494, n.10.
I i. Id. at 489.
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tion of the passing-on defense creates a very broad exception. The
Court itself recognizes it won't often be "easy to prove that [the
buyer] has not been damaged"; earlier it had called that burden .of
proof "normally . . . insurmountable." 12 And situations "where
differential can be proved between the price lawfully charged and
some price that the seller was required by law to charge"' 3 are rare
by definition.
Quite possibly, the only set of facts that will fit the definition is
the price-discrimination example mentioned by the Court. The com-
plaining buyer in a Robinson-Patman Act' 4 case is the one who paid
the higher of the two discriminatory prices. He complains that one
of his competitors was given a discount that enabled his competitor
to lure customers with price cuts. The antitrust violation here does
not involve the seller's taking from the complaining buyer of "more
than the law allows." There is no overcharge. Dozens of other buyers
might have been charged the higher price and yet have no right
of action for damages; they may not have had to compete with the
favored buyer. Rather, what the seller probably did was to take less
from the favored buyer than the law requires him to take. But this
benefit to his competitor can in no sense be regarded as a measure
of the damage suffered by the buyer who brought suit. The damage
he is ordinarily complaining about is loss of profits on sales he would
have made if his competitor had not been given an unfair price
advantage. So he must prove that he lost sales and profits. This
analysis is not reconcilable with the dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc.,
v. American Can Co. that: "If the prices are illegally discriminatory
[plaintiff] has been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances, at least in the amount of that discrimination." 15 But the
Hanover Shoe opinion can be construed as a retreat from that dictum.
Even aside from the problem of measuring damages, evidence that
a price differential was passed along to the complaining buyer's cus-
tomers may have a significant role in treble-damage suits based on
the Robinson-Patman Act. In a price-discrimination case, proof of
passing-on is relevant to an issue other than damages. Surely the
defendant seller can rebut proof of competitive injury-an essential
element of a substantive violation-with evidence that the buyer was
12. Id. at 493.
13. Id. at 494.
14. Act of June 19, 1936, c. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1965).
15. 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947).
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able to pass along the price differential to his customer without suffer-
ing a loss of profits, even if introduction of this evidence will cause
"additional long and complicated proceedings." Once the passing-on
evidence is introduced, there would appear to be no reason for not
considering it in determining damages. There is authority requiring
a buyer complaining of price discrimination to show that he miti-
gated his damages, by lowering his own resale prices or developing
his own promotions, etc., before claiming injury to himself. 6
How will the Hanover Shoe rationale affect recovery in a series
of treble-damage suits by successive buyers? If Hanover, a shoe manu-
facturer, is to recover the full amount of excessive rentals for shoe
machinery supplied by United Shoe Machinery Co., can Hanover's
wholesaler and retailer customers sue United Shoe for the amount by
which their costs were increased when Hanover passed on the ma-
chinery costs? If it is a "normally ... insurmountable" task to trace an
illegal overcharge as the cause of a corresponding price increase by
the buyer, then a subsequent buyer may have a "normally . . . in-
surmountable" burden in attempting to prove that the original over-
charge-and hence the antitrust violation-was the proximate cause
of his cost increase. But this time the "additional long and compli-
cated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated the-
ories" would be introduced at the election of the damage claimant
and would be action in furtherance of the damage suit, not some-
thing that would substantially reduce the effectiveness of treble-dam-
age actions.
Since these successive actions would be tort actions, not litigation
over title to a specific fund or res, technically there would be no
"double recovery." In theory, however, it is difficult to see how the first
buyer could recover the overcharge on the ground that it cannot be
traced to his own price increase and then the second buyer recover it
as traceable to the same price increase. Yet multiple claims of this
sort are likely to come before different juries, so all plaintiffs con-
ceivably could win.'7
16. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949); Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957). In the Enterprise
Industries case, the second circuit refused to give literal effect to the dictum, quoted in
the text from the Bruce's Juices opinion, pointing out that a provision making the price
differential the measure of damages was eliminated in conference from the Senate bill
that became the Robinson-Patman Act.
17. As a practical matter, the "double recovery" problem can be over-emphasized.
Few antitrust cases ever get to juries. They are "resolved by attrition rather than by
trial . . . decided by calculating minds putting price tags on peace and expense, rather
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IN PARI DELICTO
While the bounty hunter of the Old West is seldom portrayed as an
admirable character, his need to deal regularly with the authorities
probably forced him to maintain at least an appearance of strict com-
pliance with the law. Today's counterpart may not have to be quite so
circumspect.
In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.'8 the Su-
preme Court declared that "the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its
complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense
to an antitrust action."' 19 But the five opinions that accompanied the
Court's decision suggest that the doctrine has some definitions that
may still be operative in private antitrust damage actions. (The in pari
delicto doctrine should be distinguished from the "unclean hands"
defense sometimes discussed in antitrust decisions.20)
The declaration in the five-justice majority opinion that "the doc-
trine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects,"
is not to be applied in antitrust litigation followed a statement of the
applicable rule in other terms: "Once it is shown that the plaintiff did
not aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme as a
necessary part and parcel of it, his understandable attempts to make
the best of a bad situation should not be a ground for completely
denying him the right to recover which the antitrust acts give him." 21
Earlier, Mr. Justice Black indicated he was talking about "the common-
law pari delicto doctrine" and pointed out that, "although in pari
delicto literally means 'of equal fault,' the doctrine has been applied,
correctly or incorrectly, in a wide variety of situations in which a plain-
tiff seeking damages or equitable relief is himself involved in some of
the same sort of wrongdoing."2 2 But the justices "have often indicated
the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief
where a private suit serves important public purposes." 23 "There is
nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which indicates that
than by triers of fact attempting to price real damage." Hoffman, Proof of Damages in
Private Litigation, 36 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 151 (1967).
18. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
19. Id. at 140.
20. See, Damage-Suit Defenses-In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands, BNA ANTITRUST
8 TRADE REGULATION REPORT No. 322, at B-1 (September 12, 1967).
21. 392 U.S. at 140.
22. Id. at 138.
23. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1962).
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Congress wanted to make the .. doctrine a defense to treble-damage
actions." 24
However, the Court refrained from deciding whether "truly com-
plete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could
ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of pari delicto, for barring
a plaintiff's cause of action. ' '25 The facts of the case before the Court
made such a holding unnecessary. The damage claimants were retail
dealers operating "Midas Muffler Shops" under franchise agreements
obligating each dealer to purchase all his exhaust-system parts from the
franchisor, to carry a complete line of the franchisor's products, and to
resell Midas Mufflers at prices and locations specified by the franchisor.
In return the franchised dealer received permission to use registered
trademarks and was granted an exclusive right to sell "Midas" products
within his defined territory. In these circumstances, the majority
opinion noted, there could not have been complete involvement by the
dealers in the illegal restraints of trade created by the exclusive-dealing
and full-line requirements, for neither of those provisions could be in
a dealer's self interest. Moreover, there was evidence that the dealers
tried to get out from under these two restrictions.
True, the complaining dealers sought their franchises enthusi-
astically; but they did not actively seek each and every clause of the
agreement. They accepted many of the restraints "solely because their
acquiescence was necessary to obtain an otherwise attractive business
opportunity.' 26 The courts have no power "to undermine the antitrust
acts by denying recovery to injured parties merely because they have
participated to the extent of utilizing illegal arrangements formulated
and carried out by others." 27 Nor is it significant that the territorial
restrictions benefited the complaining dealers. "They cannot be blamed
for seeking to minimize the disadvantages of the agreement once they
had been forced to accept its more onerous terms as a condition of
doing business. ' '2 These "possible beneficial by-products," on the other
hand, "can of course be taken into consideration in computing dam-
ages." 29
While Mr. Justice White joined in the majority opinion and in
24. 392 U.S. at 138.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 139.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id.
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rejecting "the in pari delicto defense in its historic formulation, '30
he filed a special concurring opinion. "I would deny recovery where
plaintiff and defendant bear substantial equal responsibility . . . but
permit recovery in favor of the one least responsible where one is more
responsible than the other." He saw the issue before the court as being
a causation problem, maintaining that a damage claimant equally
responsible with the defendant for the antitrust violation should be
denied recovery, "for failure of proof that [defendant] was the more
substantial cause of the injury."'31
Mr. Justice Fortas concurred only in the result. He agreed that
"'private attorneys general' . . . cannot be denied [recover] on the
basis of the doctrine of in pari delicto." But he insisted that the
doctrine does have "a significant if limited role in private antitrust
law. If the fault of the parties is reasonably within the same scale-if
the 'delicto' is approximately 'pari'-then the doctrine should bar
recovery."3 2
Mr. Justice Marshall likewise concurred only in the result. His
thinking was "perhaps, less related to the public interest in eliminating
all forms of anti-competitive business conduct and more related to
the equities as between the parties." He would look not only for sub-
stantial equality of fault but also for active participation by the com-
plaining party in the formation and implementation of the illegal
scheme. He would deny recovery to the claimants who "actually
participated in the formulation of the entire agreement, trading off
anticompetitive restraints on their own freedom of action (such as
the tying and exclusive dealing provisions) for anticompetitive re-
straints intended for their benefit (such as resale price maintenance
or exclusive territories).""13
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in part and dissented in part.
They held out for application of "the true in pari delicto standard"
and expressed the view that much of the judicial disagreement that
the case has occasioned relates to the definition of "in pari delicto."
"Plaintiffs who are truly in pari delicto are those who have themselves
violated the law in cooperation with the defendant."' 4 They saw the
Kiefer-Stewart decision-that a supplier sued for resale price main-
30. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 150-51.
34. Id. at 153.
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tenance cannot defend by proving the complaining buyer's participa-
tion in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy-as distinguishable from
true in pari delicto because there the defendants' illegal actions were
taken in reprisal against altogether independent illegal actions by the
plaintiff. And they would deal with large supplier-small customer
situations like those involved in the Simpson case,85 Albrecht v. Herald
Co.,36 and perhaps the present case "on the theory of a 'coercion'
exception to the in pari delicto doctrine."8 7
Despite the majority opinion's broad assertions, an "in pari delicto"
doctrine will continue to function in private antitrust litigation. After
all, Mr. Justice Black excluded the in pari delicto doctrine only as it
was defined and applied at common law, "with its complex scope, con-
tents, and effects." Like the passing-on defense, in pari delicto, as
traditionally used, has ramifications that would frustrate antitrust
policy. If the plaintiff "aggressively support[s] and further[s] the
monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it," even Mr.
Justice Black would deny him damages.
Moreover, after disqualifying any plaintiff who "aggressively sup-
port[s] and further[s] the monopolistic scheme," the majority opinion
clears one who merely engages in "understandable attempts to make
the best of a bad situation." Between these two degrees of participation
by the plaintiff there are conceivable levels of involvement that the
Court has not expressed a view on. For plaintiffs in those categories,
the best guideline available is that set out, in somewhat different
terms, by Mr. Justice White, who would disqualify the "equally
responsible" plaintiff; Mr. Justice Fortas, who would apply the "in
pari delicto" label to "equality of position"; and Mr. justice Marshall,
who would find the plaintiff "substantially equally at fault" to be in
pari delicto. Indeed, since Mr. Justice White joined in the majority
opinion, his "equally responsible" test can be regarded as consistent
with the majority view.
Finally, seven of the justices agree that the complaining franchisees
were not real "collaborators" or "co-adventurers" (Mr. Justice Fortas'
terms) in the exclusive-dealing requirements they were complaining
about. If the Court should ever get a case involving "collaborators"
or "co-adventurers" who are "equally responsible" with the defendant
35. 377 U.S. 13 (1962).
36. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. 392 U.S. at 155.
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for the illegal conduct, then at least five justices will find the "col-
laborators" to be in pari delicto and deny them damages.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the primary significance of both the Perma Life and Hanover
Shoe opinions lies in their manifestation of the Supreme Court's
continuing lively interest in the effectiveness of private damage actions
as an antitrust enforcement tool. In recent years the Court's opinions
have made increasingly warm statements about private antitrust litiga-
tion.38 The attitude and trend evident in these decisions may fore-
shadow the answers to be expected to some of the other damage-suit
issues that have not yet reached the Court-e.g., standing to sue,3 9 use
of FTC decrees,40 applicability of the damage provision to Section. .7
Clayton Act violations,41 and the extent to which the new class-action
rule can be used to aggregate small antitrust damage claims.4 2
Actually, though, it was not the pronouncements of a Supreme Court
blessing that opened the Golden Age of the antitrust bounty hunter.
That era arrived with the filing of some 1900 treble-damage suits in
the wake of the 1960 convictions and 1961 sentencing of the electrical-
equipment industry for conspiring to fix prices. 43 It was what these
cases did for bounty hunters that makes the Supreme Court's helpful
attitude so significant to the business world and to the legal profession.
This was not the first time customers of an industry had moved in
to share the spoils of a raid by the Justice Department. It happened
after U.S. v. Paramount,44 and, to a lesser extent, after U.S. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.45 But the electrical-equipment damage cases
were unprecedented not only in their size and number but also in
the big-business status of the plaintiffs. They did more than arm the
38. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Minnesota Mining and Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
39. See Scott and Rockefeller, BNA, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION TODAY; 1967,
305 (1967).
40. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 340.
42. See, Class Actions for Treble Damages, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION
REPORT, No. 310 at B-1 (June 20, 1967); Antitrust Class Actions-Recent Decisions, BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT, No. 359 at B-1 (May 28, 1968).
43. United States v. General Electric Co., et al., Criminal Actions Nos. 20235 et seq.,
E.D. Pa.
44. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
45. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
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treble-damage complainant with fearsome new discovery techniques.
For the first time the treble-damage remedy won wide-spread public
acceptance by the management of the large corporations in a major
industry-the electric utilities. For the first time, it acquired re-
spectability and status as an accepted commercial stratagem of big
business. People with ample means to finance the long search and the
complex shoot-out are now bounty hunters.46
Today's big bounty hunter does not ride alone; the sophistication
and strength of the quarry and the intricacies of the available defenses
call for the aid of a professional. Questions have already arisen con-
cerning the proper role of the hired gun on either side of this game
of bounty hunting. At a committee meeting last August during the
American Bar Association convention in Philadelphia, a federal judge
said:
I think this is an area where lawyers come closest without realizing
it to the very limits of what is ethically proper. It seems to me that
in this area lawyers are generally closer to the line. From the
plaintiff's side they are closer to the line on maintenance and
champerty, claim solicitation and that sort of thing. From the
defendant's side they are closer to the line in actually advising
clients to cover up criminal activity. Some of the essays which I
have read in the Antitrust Law Journal, if you took out the word
"antitrust" and substituted "prostitution" you would think that
the lawyer would be disbarred. I think that the whole field should
be carefully reexamined by its practitioners. 47
46. In a related-and perhaps consequential-development, Senator Philip A. Hart
(D-Mich) recently urged the Small Business Administration to ease its standards for
loans to finance antitrust suits by small business.
47. These remarks were made by Hon. John P. Fullam, U.S. District Judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, during a panel discussion on the "Relationship Be-
tween Government Enforcement Actions and Private Damage Actions" held in Philadel-
phia, Pa. on August 3, 1968. The text of the discussion will be reported in Issue 4 of
Volume 37 of the ABA ANTrRusT L.J.
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